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Banks play a central role in the ﬁ  nancial system and also in the real economy as the 2008 ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has vividly illustrated. Their smooth functioning allows for the intermediation of funds in the 
economy and provides for a wide range of ﬁ  nancial services. In order to ensure this banks need 
not only to adequately monitor their risks but also to efﬁ  ciently allocate their resources. Hence, the 
measurement of bank performance is a critical issue that has deserved considerable attention in the 
banking literature.
In this paper, we propose to analyse developments in the performance of the Portuguese banking 
system between 1992 and 2004, a period in which signiﬁ  cant changes were observed, including the 
process of liberalization, consolidation and ﬁ  nancial innovation.1 These changes had a profound im-
pact on the market’s structure and on banks’ technology and, through the analysis of a cost function, 
we assess how they affected banks’ marginal costs and total productivity, which we decompose into 
the effect of scale efﬁ  ciency change, cost efﬁ  ciency change and technological progress.2 In this way, 
we can not only quantify total factor productivity growth, but also identify if changes in productivity 
were driven by moving to a different point in the cost function, by moving closer to the cost frontier or 
by shifts in the frontier itself.
Previous empirical results on the efﬁ  ciency of Portuguese banks include the work by Mendes and 
Rebelo (1999), Mendes and Rebelo (2000), Pinho (2001), Canhoto and Dermine (2003), Lima (2008) 
and Lima and Pinho (2008). The majority of these studies estimated translog cost functions using 
Stochastic frontier Analysis (SFA), while in the one by Canhoto and Dermine (2003) a non-parametric 
frontier was estimated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Mendes and Rebelo (2000) em-
ploy both methodologies.
Even though the above mentioned studies use different empirical and theoretical approaches to the 
modelling of banks’ activity and cover different time periods (starting in 1987 and ending in 2004), 
(1)  For a brief overview of the liberalization process see Ribeiro (2007) and Banco de Portugal (2009).
(2)  Cost efﬁ  ciency is commonly referred to in the literature as X-efﬁ  ciency.
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errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
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all but the one by Mendes and Rebelo (1999) found that the productivity of Portuguese banks has 
increased through time. However, as expected given the differences in the approaches, they do not 
agree on the levels of X-inefﬁ  ciency. The identiﬁ  cation of shifts in best practices and changes in the 
distance at which banks operate from the efﬁ  cient frontier also varies across studies according to 
the methodology employed. In fact, some studies do not allow for the distinction of the two effects, 
since the frontier is assumed to be constant over time, so that all productivity changes are attributed 
to changes in cost efﬁ  ciency. Further, Pinho (2001) and Mendes and Rebelo (2000) found that state-
owned banks tend to perform worse on average whereas Canhoto and Dermine (2003) found that 
banks which were created after 1984 and foreign banks perform better than older banks which oper-
ated under the previously prevalent tightly regulated market conditions, including state-owned banks. 
Further, Mendes and Rebelo (2000) and Lima (2008) found that mergers contributed to increase 
banks’ performance.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and the data 
used to estimate banks’ cost function and productivity. Section 3 presents the empirical results of 
this article and is divided into 6 subsections, comprising the discussion of the estimates for Portu-
guese banks’ marginal costs, the shadow cost of equity, scale efﬁ  ciency, cost efﬁ  ciency, technological 
progress and total factor productivity growth. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
2. METHODOLOGY  AND  DATA
The modelling of banks’ production has been the subject of considerable debate in the literature, es-
sentially due to the controversy regarding the classiﬁ  cation of customer deposits as inputs or as out-
puts. On the one hand, the production approach to bank modelling regards banks as ﬁ  rms producing 
services which are related to loans and deposit accounts, thus identifying as outputs the number of 
deposit accounts serviced and the number of loans originated and as inputs labour and physical capi-
tal. On the other hand, according to the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley (1977)), banks’ 
main activity is granting loans and investing in securities and other assets using funds obtained 
through deposits, purchased funds and equity.3 There are sensible theoretical arguments supporting 
both approaches, and there is not a clear preference for either of them in empirical applications.4 
However, as remarked in Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) the inclusion of deposits both as inputs 
and as outputs would yield misleading results. In this case, the cost function would include both the 
level of deposits (since deposits are an output) and the price of deposits, whereas the deﬁ  nition of 
costs would include deposit related interest expenses (since deposits are an input). The argument 
is that the optimal choice of one input – deposits – would not be inﬂ  uenced by the price of this input, 
since its quantity is held ﬁ  xed.
There are two main reasons why holding deposits is an attractive activity for banks. On the one hand, 
as suggested by the production approach, deposits generate commission income and are a product 
(3)  See Freixas and Rochet (1998), p.p. 77-79, on the production and intermediation approach.
(4)  The fact that the production approach identiﬁ  es as outputs the number of loans originated and deposit accounts constitutes an additional complication 
since this data is often unavailable. Studies which follow the production approach usually circumvent this issue by proxying the number of loans and 
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which adds value in itself, as the general public does not have access to the same investment op-
portunities as banks. On the other hand, they are a relatively low cost and stable source of funding. 
Either way, a considerable part of banks’ resources is dedicated to the origination and management 
of deposits. However, even though on a smaller scale, the acquisition and management of any input 
carries costs.
Based on the test proposed in Hughes and Mester (1993) we chose to model deposits as an input 
since the elasticity of total costs deducted of interest paid on deposits with respect to the level of 
deposits is negative.5 This speciﬁ  cation has the additional advantage of allowing for a more compre-
hensive deﬁ  nition of banks’ costs, since otherwise the speciﬁ  cation would totally ignore funding costs, 
and so the measurement of efﬁ  ciency would be limited to operational costs. Such an analysis could 
yield misleading results as some banks may be willing to bear higher operational costs (with employ-
ees and equipment) in order to optimize their funding structure, thus attaining lower funding costs. 
A similar argument motivates the inclusion of equity as a ﬁ  xed input since, as remarked in Hughes, 
Mester and Moon (2001), otherwise banks which ﬁ  nd relatively more funding in equity and less in 
debt would spuriously appear to be more efﬁ  cient. The fact that equity is treated as a ﬁ  xed rather than 
a variable input is justiﬁ  ed by regulatory and rating/reputation constraints to the choice of the optimal 
level of equity. Further, the costs associated to common equity issues lead banks to raise capital in 
relatively large tranches. As a consequence, current levels of capital need not only sufﬁ  ce to cover 
risks currently incurred, but should also accommodate the future growth of assets. As such, banks 
may have a higher level of equity than that yielded by the individual static maximization problem.
Hence, banks are assumed to minimize labour, funding and capital related costs () ++ LF K wL wF wK          
s  ubject to the production of a predetermined amount of loans () 1 y  and other earning assets () 2 y  and 
to the maintenance of a given level of equity () 0 e :
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(5)  The reasoning behind this test is that increasing the use of an input should decrease costs incurred with other inputs, whereas an increase in the produc-
tion of an output should be associated with an increase in costs.Part II  |  Articles
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The price of funding is computed as the ratio between the ﬂ  ow of interest paid and the stock of interest 
bearing liabilities and the price of labour is deﬁ  ned as the ratio between labour costs and the number 
of employees, whereas the price of capital was proxied by the ratio between the sum of depreciation 
and general administrative costs (excluding labour) and the stock of tangible and intangible assets.
It is well known that banks, as is true with other ﬁ  rms, either due to agency problems or due to differ-
ences in managerial ability, do not strictly behave as proﬁ  t maximizers, and some banks are closer 
to optimal behaviour than others. Furthermore, as usual in empirical applications, the performance 
of each bank is also affected by random factors, and the variables used in the estimations may be 
subject to measurement error. Hence, in order to analyse the cost efﬁ  ciency of Portuguese banks 
since the early nineties, the cost function stemming from Equation (1) is estimated using Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis models. The main equation to be estimated in the model may be expressed as:
(3) () ( ) ,, , , , , , , ,, , it t rit kit it it it lnC lnC t y w e v u =+ +
where  () ,, ,, , ,, , tr i t k i ti t Cty w e  represents the estimated cost frontier and  , it C  are banks’ actual costs, 
so that a banks’ observed costs are bounded below by the sum of the estimated cost frontier and a 
random error () , it v  which is assumed to follow an i.i.d.  ()
2 0, v N σ  distribution and accounts for meas-
urement error of the level of costs, as well as for the effect of other random uncontrollable shocks. 
The sum of  () ,, ,, , ,, , tr i t k i ti t lnC t y w e  and  , it v  constitutes the stochastic frontier, and  , it u  is a non-
negative random variable which measures cost inefﬁ  ciency as the difference between realized cost 
and the stochastic cost frontier. There are several models established in the literature which make 
different assumptions about the distribution of  , it u . Battese and Coelli (1995) assume that the  , it u  are 
independently distributed as truncations at zero of the  ()
2
, , it u Nm σ  distribution, where  ,, it it mz δ =  
and, in turn,  , it z  is a vector of ﬁ  rm speciﬁ  c and time varying variables and δ  is a vector of unknown 
coefﬁ  cients to be estimated. This speciﬁ  cation has the advantage of allowing for an interpretation of 
how some selected variables (those included in  , it z ) are related with estimated cost efﬁ  ciency. The 
variables included in  , it z  were the ratio of non-performing loans outstanding for less than one year 
to granted loans () NPL  as a measure of credit risk, banks’ credit market share () Msc  as a measure 
of relative size, ROE  an ROA as proﬁ  tability measures, the equity to assets ratio () .  Cap Ratio  
and a measure of liquidity deﬁ  ned as the ratio of volatile assets to volatile liabilities () .  Liq Ratio .Articles  |  Part II
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An alternative model, proposed in Battese and Coelli (1992) deﬁ  nes  , it u  as follows:
() () , exp it i uu t T η =− − (4)
Where  i u  are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the  ()
2 , u N μσ  distri-
bution and μ and η  are parameters to be estimated. In this speciﬁ  cation, inefﬁ  ciency is ﬁ  rm speciﬁ  c 
and is allowed to vary through time even though, unlike in the model proposed in Battese and Coelli 
(1995), the ranking of ﬁ  rms remains constant through time. If η  is not found to be statistically signiﬁ  -
cant, it can be constrained to zero, so as to maximize the degrees of freedom by estimating no more 
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A fully efﬁ  cient bank’s actual cost is on the cost frontier, so that its efﬁ  ciency is 100%, whereas an X% 
efﬁ  cient bank’s actual cost is above the frontier, so that it could theoretically produce the same output 
with only X% of its actual cost.
In order to provide a good approximation to the true cost function while preserving the available de-
grees of freedom and avoiding multicollinearity problems, the choice of the functional form in which 
the cost function is speciﬁ  ed should obtain a balance between ﬂ  exibility and parsimony. While the 
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁ  cation is acknowledged to be too restrictive, the translog functional form pro-
vides a ﬂ  exible local approximation and the Fourier functional form provides a global approximation. 
Berger and Mester (1997) found the difference between the two latter functional forms to be statisti-
cally but not economically relevant. Hence, and given the relatively small number of observations in 
our sample, the cost function is estimated using a translog functional form, which can be written as:
2
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where the usual theoretical restrictions stemming from duality theory (i.e. symmetry and linear homo-
geneity in prices) were imposed. The associated cost share equations implied by Shephard’s lemma 
were not imposed since they hold only under the assumption that no allocative inefﬁ  ciency exists. 
Hence, our measure of X-inefﬁ  ciency comprises both technical and allocative inefﬁ  ciency.
The dataset used in this study was obtained from banks’ ﬁ  nancial statements reported to Banco de 
Portugal. The database comprises an unbalanced panel of yearly data for all banks operating in Por-Part II  |  Articles
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tugal from 1991 to 2004.6 Total loans were adjusted for securitization, essentially since the originating 
bank is generally still responsible for servicing securitized loans. Hence, if this correction were not to 
be undertaken, the cost efﬁ  ciency of banks involved in securitization operations would be underes-
timated.7 Non-performing loans are not included in the deﬁ  nition of output since they are essentially 
a non-income producing item in banks’ balance sheet. Hence, this procedure accounts for different 
levels of credit risk in banks’ loan portfolios and implicitly corrects for the differences in the level 
and in the quality of banks’ screening and monitoring activities of their borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
Note, however, that this argument implicitly assumes that banks’ loan portfolios are homogeneous. 
In practice, each bank may target different loan segments which have different levels of credit risk 
associated. Even though some effort was made in the selection of a sample of banks with a relatively 
similar activity in order to mitigate this problem, a full solution would involve deﬁ  ning a separate 
output for different categories of loans. In our case, this was not viable since it would imply a large 
increase in the number of parameters to be estimated, which could not be accommodated within the 
size of our sample.
All banks operating in Portugal are required to report ﬁ  nancial statements to Banco de Portugal. 
However, in order to ensure that the analysis focuses on banks which operate with a similar tech-
nology, so that it is legitimate to include them in the same cost function, only universal banks with a 
retail branch network were included in the sample. Further, newly created banks were included only 
from their third year of operation, in order to avoid biases associated with short-term misalignments 
between setup costs and output.
After applying these ﬁ  lters, a sample of 25 banks, comprising a total of 254 bank-year pairs was ob-
tained. For each year, the sample covers at least 77% of total loans, 80% of total assets and 87% of 
total deposits in the Portuguese banking system. Further, the market share of the ﬁ  ve largest banks, 
when measured in terms of total assets in the sample, increased from around 57% in 1992 to near 
70% in 2004, in similar fashion to what was observed in the whole banking system.
3. EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
This section presents the main results of the analysis. All results are based on the estimation of Equa-
tion (6) and are summarized in Table 1. Since the data are expressed as deviations from the overall 
sample mean, one can easily assess relevant cost function elasticities evaluated at the mean by 
directly analysing single parameters.8 Hence, in order to clarify the exposition, most cross terms are 
not shown in Table 1.9 A preliminary analysis of estimation results shows that the elasticity of cost with 
respect to each of the input prices is positive. Furthermore, the input price to which costs react most 
is the price of funding, which is not surprising considering that funding costs constitute the highest 
(6)  The reason why more recent data was not used is that in 2005 there were changes in accounting standards, so that data until 2004 is not comparable with 
the more recent data.
(7)  Securitization in Portugal began in 1997 and grew rapidly in recent years, accounting for around 6% of aggregate loans outstanding in 2004. Nonetheless, 
some heterogeneity was present among banks, with a particular bank presenting a share of securitized loans as high as 34% on a non-consolidated basis 
in 2004.
(8)  For a discussion of why this holds, see Boucinha, Ribeiro and Weyman-Jones (2009).
(9)  The full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.Articles  |  Part II
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share of total costs. The sum of the parameters on the two outputs is close to one, indicating close 
to constant returns to scale at the sample mean. The fact that the parameter on the interaction term 
between the two outputs is negative indicates that there are scope economies in the joint produc-
tion of loans and other earning assets. There is statistically signiﬁ  cant cost reducing technological 
progress at the sample mean and banks with higher levels of equity tend to have lower costs with 
other inputs. The estimate for γ  indicates the percentage of the total error’s variance which is ac-
counted for by cost inefﬁ  ciency rather than by the classical random error and the fact that it is statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant in every speciﬁ  cation provides evidence that the estimation of the cost function as a 
frontier is appropriate. Further, the estimate for γ  is lower in the models which include explanatory 
Table 1
COST FRONTIER ESTIMATION RESULTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(WL) 0.1260 0.1253 0.1266 0.1278 0.1519 0.1148 0.1147
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
ln(WF) 0.6233 0.6243 0.6226 0.6213 0.6019 0.6364 0.6367
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(y1) 0.5800 0.5798 0.5798 0.6040 0.5872 0.5562 0.5566
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(y2) 0.4472 0.4468 0.4475 0.4679 0.4409 0.4589 0.4591
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(y1)*ln(y2) -0.2201 -0.2208 -0.2194 -0.2417 -0.2079 -0.2496 -0.2499
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
t -0.0192 -0.0191 -0.0194 -0.0195 -0.0236 -0.0142 -0.0143
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ln(e) -0.0061 -0.0053 -0.0067 -0.0539 -0.0002 -0.0486 -0.0492
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
NPL 0.8847 0.8842 0.8845 0.8978 0.6681
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Msc -1.0852 -1.0759 -1.0835 -0.9847 -1.1822
0.30 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.40
Cap. Ratio -0.7913 -0.7739 -0.7865 -0.7525











γ 0.7126 0.7169 0.7130 0.7033 0.5442 0.77 0.77
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.31 0.1295 0.1258
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are reported in italics. In the cost function speciﬁ  cation, the constant and most cross terms were omitted as they have no direct inter-
pretation. The complete estimation results are available from the authors upon request.Part II  |  Articles
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variables in the deﬁ  nition of inefﬁ  ciency, which should be expected as the z-variables capture some 
of the variance of  , it u .
The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve columns of the table provide the results for models where estimated inefﬁ  ciency is 
deﬁ  ned as a function of a series of bank characteristics. Banks with a higher ratio between the ﬂ  ow 
of non-performing loans and total loans granted show up to be more cost inefﬁ  cient. This result 
suggests that loan delinquency works as a proxy for manager skill, i.e. managers who are poor at 
monitoring and screening loans are also poor at controlling costs. Banks with a larger market share 
in loans show up to be more cost efﬁ  cient, which could indicate that larger banks are able to at-
tract more competent managers. This hypothesis could in turn reﬂ  ect larger salaries and perks than 
smaller banks able to pay to their top management as well as the prestige that comes from leading 
the largest banks. More capitalized banks show up to be more cost efﬁ  cient, which could reﬂ  ect lower 
agency costs. Proﬁ  tability does not show up to be a relevant determinant of cost efﬁ  ciency. Banks’ 
liquidity ratio is positively related with cost inefﬁ  ciency, indicating that banks with less aggressive 
liquidity management also tend to be less cost efﬁ  cient. One should nonetheless note that banks that 
choose to hold lower liquidity buffers will be subject to higher funding liquidity risk, which may not 
be properly priced in wholesale markets in times of smooth market functioning, such as the one that 
prevailed during the sample period.
In the seventh column of Table 1, the estimate for bank speciﬁ  c cost inefﬁ  ciency is deﬁ  ned as a func-
tion of time, as shown in Equation (4). However, since the estimate for η  was not found to be statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant, the next column of the table presents estimation results in which it is restricted to 
zero in order to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom due to the estimation of redundant parameters. 
This is the speciﬁ  cation used for the analysis whose results are presented in detail in the following 
subsections, the ﬁ  rst of which presents results concerning estimated marginal costs for each bank 
as well as their behaviour over time. The next subsection discusses the estimates for banks’ shadow 
cost of equity capital. The third subsection discusses results concerning scale efﬁ  ciency. The follow-
ing subsections present results concerning cost efﬁ  ciency and technological progress. In the last sub-
section changes in total factor productivity are quantiﬁ  ed and decomposed in order to assess whether 
they were driven mainly by changes in the optimum technology, by the technology of each bank ap-
proaching the best practices, or simply by banks moving to a different point in the same cost function.
3.1. Marginal costs
Using the estimated parameters for the cost function, marginal cost estimates for the production of 
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Note that Equation (7) yields bank speciﬁ  c marginal cost estimates for both the production of bank 
loans and of other earning assets. Hence, the time-series presented in Table 2 were constructed 
by aggregating the individual estimates, using each bank’s market share in loans as weights. Since Articles  |  Part II
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funding costs constitute a major share of banks’ variable costs and interest rates have decreased 
markedly during the period under analysis, the fact that the marginal cost estimates have decreased 
sharply over time is not surprising (Chart 1). Nonetheless, an interesting question is whether real 
resource marginal costs also decreased through time. A proxy for banks’ non-ﬁ  nancial marginal cost 
is obtained by deducing the estimated marginal cost for each bank of the corresponding price of fund-
ing. As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 and in Chart 2, this measure also presents a decreasing 
trend, indicating that, despite contributing to the proﬁ  le observed in marginal costs through time, the 
behaviour of interest rates alone is not enough to explain it. It should be mentioned that during the 
period under analysis there was a change in the structure of banks’ loan portfolio, with an increase in 
Chart 1
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Table 2
MARGINAL COST ESTIMATES AT THE WEIGHTED SAMPLE MEAN
Year Marginal cost 
of loans
Marginal 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1992 14.59% 14.03% 16.72% 10.74% 3.85% 3.29% 17.15% 2.56%
1993 12.43% 11.79% 13.17% 8.94% 3.48% 2.84% 15.45% 3.02%
1994 10.21% 9.41% 11.23% 7.01% 3.20% 2.40% 13.08% 2.86%
1995 10.10% 9.31% 9.79% 7.09% 3.01% 2.21% 12.26% 2.15%
1996 8.35% 7.73% 7.27% 5.71% 2.64% 2.02% 10.72% 2.37%
1997 7.04% 6.45% 5.61% 4.65% 2.39% 1.80% 9.24% 2.20%
1998 5.69% 5.26% 4.23% 3.59% 2.10% 1.66% 7.44% 1.75%
1999 4.53% 4.05% 2.96% 2.65% 1.89% 1.41% 5.78% 1.25%
2000 4.93% 4.40% 4.39% 3.28% 1.64% 1.11% 6.13% 1.20%
2001 4.85% 4.41% 4.26% 3.46% 1.40% 0.95% 6.30% 1.45%
2002 4.12% 4.03% 3.32% 2.76% 1.35% 1.26% 5.36% 1.24%
2003 3.46% 3.54% 2.33% 2.28% 1.17% 1.26% 4.56% 1.10%
2004 3.21% 3.30% 2.11% 2.00% 1.21% 1.29% 4.21% 1.00%
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Note: Total loans adjusted for securitization are used as weights in the computation of means.Part II  |  Articles
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the share of loans to households as opposed to a decrease in the weight of loans to the public sector. 
This structural change should have contributed to an increase in the marginal cost of total loans. As 
such, the signiﬁ  cant reduction in the estimated operational marginal cost of loans was not driven by 
changes in the composition of the loan portfolio. 
As illustrated in Chart 2 and documented in Table 2, the marginal cost of loans has generally been 
higher than that of other earning assets, indicating that it is more resource consuming to provide an 
additional loan than it is to invest in securities, which should be related with the screening and moni-
toring costs involved in granting loans. However, this difference has become less relevant through 
time. In order to understand this development, one should keep in mind that the output which is 
deﬁ  ned as other earning assets includes quite heterogeneous products. Furthermore, during the 
sample period there have been changes to the composition of this output. In fact, whereas during the 
early 1990’s banks had signiﬁ  cant resources invested in government bonds and deposits with the 
central bank, with the liberalization of the banking system and ﬁ  nancial innovation, banks started to 
invest in more sophisticated assets which, due to their greater complexity, require the use of more 
resources.
Furthermore, using data on banks’ loan related interest income and stock of outstanding loans, one 
may compute an implicit interest rate on loans, as shown in column 7 of Table 2. Deducing the mar-
ginal cost from this interest rate, a measure of banks’ price cost margin is obtained. According to the 
results shown in the last column of Table 2 and in Chart 3, this measure has decreased through time, 
which is consistent with the result found in Boucinha and Ribeiro (2009), according to which competi-
tion in the banking system has increased during the period under scrutiny.10
3.2. Shadow cost of equity
Since the estimated cost function includes the level of equity as a ﬁ  xed input, it allows for the compu-
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The rationale underlying the computation of the shadow cost of equity is to provide a measure of how 
much banks are willing to pay for equity, since it indicates the amount that they would save in other 
costs as a result of an increase in the level of equity.11
As shown in Chart 4 the time series obtained by aggregating the estimates for the shadow cost of eq-
uity is strongly correlated with market interest rates and with banks’ weighted average cost of deposit 
(10) The measure of implicit interest rate used is computed based on interest income and loan stocks which do not include non-performing loans. Hence, it 
is a proxy for the interest rate that banks charge their customers, which should be higher than the average interest rate that they actually receive due to 
loan delinquency. Hence, the decrease in non-performing loans observed throughout the sample period should also have contributed to the decrease 
observed in banks’ price-cost margin. Nonetheless, constructing a measure of interest rate which is a lower bound for the one that banks actually receive, 
since it includes non-performing loans but not the interest on these loans, the decreasing pattern found for the margin on loans is still present. Hence, this 
behaviour was not solely driven by the decrease in loan delinquency observed throughout the sample period.
(11) One must bear in mind the limitations of the model employed, by operating under the framework of a static optimization model estimated using non-
consolidated accounting data.Articles  |  Part II
Financial Stability Report May 2010  |  Banco de Portugal 129
and market debt funding. This result is consistent with shareholder capital being a source of funding 
in itself, so that funding costs are the ones which are most affected by the level of equity.
The obtained measure of the shadow cost of equity, presented in Table 3, is lower than (what is 
generally acknowledged to be a reasonable value for) the actual price of equity. This result is not 
surprising and supports our choice of modelling equity capital as a ﬁ  xed rather than a variable input, 
since it suggests that the regulatory and reputation constraints to the level of equity are in fact rel-
evant, so that banks hold a higher level of equity capital than the one which would solve their static 
unconstrained optimization problem.
Chart 4
THE SHADOW COST OF EQUITY
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Table 3
THE SHADOW COST OF EQUITY
Year Shadow cost 
of equity (full 
sample)
Shadow cost 










Implicit price of 
funding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1993 13.20% 17.02% 13.17% 10.33% 7.41% 8.94%
1994 8.94% 11.60% 11.23% 10.48% 6.97% 7.01%
1995 7.13% 9.52% 9.79% 11.47% 6.54% 7.09%
1996 3.93% 5.51% 7.27% 8.56% 6.29% 5.71%
1997 2.67% 4.09% 5.61% 6.36% 6.07% 4.65%
1998 3.04% 4.04% 4.23% 4.88% 6.39% 3.59%
1999 1.55% 2.96% 2.96% 4.78% 6.50% 2.65%
2000 2.87% 4.92% 4.39% 5.60% 6.04% 3.28%
2001 4.01% 4.94% 4.26% 5.16% 5.85% 3.46%
2002 3.46% 4.46% 3.32% 5.01% 6.13% 2.76%
2003 1.90% 3.56% 2.33% 4.18% 6.36% 2.28%
2004 1.51% 3.04% 2.11% 4.14% 6.33% 2.00%
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Note: Total loans adjusted for securitization are used as weights in the computation of means. Part II  |  Articles
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With the purpose of investigating what drives differences in banks’ shadow cost of equity, this variable 
was regressed upon a set of bank speciﬁ  c variables, including each bank’s capital ratio and return on 
equity and dummy variables which identify public banks, branches of credit institutions whose head 
ofﬁ  ce is in foreign countries and large banks (the 20% larger banks in each year).12
In order to avoid simultaneity issues concerning the shadow cost of equity and banks’ capital ratio 
and return on equity, the lag rather than the contemporary value of these variables is used. Since the 
dummy variable which identiﬁ  es branches of credit institutions whose head ofﬁ  ce is in foreign coun-
tries is time invariant, identiﬁ  cation of the coefﬁ  cient on this variable is not possible in a regression 
which includes bank speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed-effects. Hence, both ﬁ  xed-effects and random-effects regressions 
are shown.
The results of these regressions, shown in Table 4, suggest that more capitalized banks tend to have 
a higher shadow cost of equity. A positive effect of proﬁ  tability is also found, which may reﬂ  ect higher 
risk incurred by the bank. Possibly reﬂ  ecting lower credit risk perceived by debt markets, state owned 
banks tend to have a lower shadow cost of equity. Branches of credit institutions whose head ofﬁ  ce is 
in foreign countries generally represent a relatively small portion of their banking group’s assets, so 
that their activity hardly inﬂ  uences the group’s credit rating and they often resort directly to the head 
ofﬁ  ce in order to obtain funding. Hence, it is not surprising to ﬁ  nd that these banks tend to have a 
lower shadow cost of equity on average. Conversely, larger banks, which tend to be more transparent 
and whose equity is more likely to be traded in public markets, tend to have a higher shadow cost of 
equity.
(12) The fact that the dependent variable of this regression is itself an estimate means that the standard errors of this regression are not valid, since they do 
not account for the variance of the dependent variable.
Table 4










State-owned bank (dummy variable) -0.05 -0.04
0.02 0.02
Branch of credit institution whose head ofﬁ  ce is in foreign countries (dummy variable) -0.08
0.04
20% largest banks (dummy variable) 0.02 0.04
0.01 0.02
Hausman test (p-value) 0.995
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are reported in italics. Time dummies and a constant were included in the regressions.Articles  |  Part II
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3.3. Scale efﬁ  ciency
The assessment of scale economies has been the subject of extensive discussion in the literature. 
Even though there are many theoretical arguments supporting their existence and they are typically 
invoked by bank managers as a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, empirical studies often fail 
to ﬁ  nd them in the data. The identiﬁ  cation of scale economies has relevant implications since it allows 
for inference on the adequacy of the market structure from a technological point of view.
This section assesses the presence of scale economies since the liberalization of the Portuguese 













An elasticity of cost with respect to total loans smaller (larger) than one is obtained in the presence 
of scale economies (diseconomies). As shown in Table 5, statistically signiﬁ  cant scale diseconomies 
(as deﬁ  ned above) were found during the early 1990’s so that, all else equal, an increase in banks’ 
size implied a more than proportional increase in costs. In the more recent period, the estimate for 
the scale parameter is slightly below one, albeit not statistically different from one, indicating virtually 
constant returns to scale. One should, nonetheless, keep in mind that the elasticity computed accord-
ing to Equation (9) is a measure of short-run or constrained scale economies, since the level of equity 
is held ﬁ  xed. Furthermore, since the deﬁ  nition of cost employed does not include the cost of equity, 
the measure of scale economies presented above is actually a measure of cash ﬂ  ow cost economies. 
This measure is likely to overestimate the true scale parameter, since the fact that the level of equity 
is held ﬁ  xed implies that any increase in output must be totally ﬁ  nanced by interest bearing debt, so 
that the cost of debt is forced to increase more than what would be realistic.
Table 5
SCALE ECONOMIES
Year Scale Economies (SE) p-value (H0: SE=1) Economic Scale 
Economies (ESE)
p-value (H0: ESE=1)
1992 1.0919 0.00 0.9698 0.01
1993 1.0747 0.00 0.9678 0.01
1994 1.0505 0.02 0.9664 0.00
1995 1.0349 0.08 0.9687 0.01
1996 1.0156 0.41 0.9665 0.00
1997 0.9995 0.98 0.9628 0.00
1998 1.0010 0.96 0.9533 0.00
1999 0.9882 0.57 0.9457 0.00
2000 0.9906 0.66 0.9431 0.00
2001 0.9933 0.79 0.9409 0.00
2002 0.9909 0.71 0.9363 0.00
2003 0.9770 0.35 0.9347 0.00
2004 0.9658 0.20 0.9297 0.00
1992-2004 0.9964 0.86 0.9447 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Total loans adjusted for securitization are used as weights in the computation of means. SE denotes scale economies as deﬁ  ned in Equation (9) and 
ESE refers to economic scale economies as deﬁ  ned in Equation (14). Part II  |  Articles
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A measure of scale economies which allows for the level of capital to change in response to changes 
in output could be obtained by estimating a cost function where equity is treated similarly to the other 
inputs. However, as mentioned above, we do not think that this would be an optimal solution, as there 
are important constraints to the choice of banks’ level of equity capital. Furthermore, even in the more 
recent period, only a small number of Portuguese banks are listed in the stock exchange market, so 
that it is not straightforward to obtain estimates for the cost of equity.
Alternatively, as outlined in Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001), citing an original proposal by Hughes 
(1999), one can compute a measure of economic scale economies assuming that the observed level 
of equity capital minimizes economic cost at the shadow price of equity, since it then holds that:
() ( ) *
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Since the level of equity capital e  minimizes economic cost, the constrained marginal cost equals the 
long run marginal cost:
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An aggregate time-series of the estimates for scale economies obtained through the aggregation of 
the individual estimates yielded by the computation of Equation (14) is presented in Table 5. While 
this measure presents the same decreasing proﬁ  le as the constrained measure, its level is consider-
ably lower at each year. Hence, accounting for the fact that banks’ level of capital is allowed to vary Articles  |  Part II
Financial Stability Report May 2010  |  Banco de Portugal 133
according to changes in banks’ output, one ﬁ  nds statistically signiﬁ  cant scale economies for the full 
period under scrutiny, which suggests that the concentration process observed in the Portuguese 
banking system was at least partly driven by the opportunity to increase productive efﬁ  ciency.
Estimated scale economies show up to be stronger at the end of the sample when compared to the 
early 1990’s. This result is likely to be linked with the changes to banks’ technology brought about 
by technological progress. In fact, the increasing automation of services should have allowed for a 
decrease in banks’ variable costs at the expense of a more signiﬁ  cant initial investment in technol-
ogy, such as storage and processing of information and communication facilities. These technologi-
cal developments in turn allowed for the setup of a dense ATM network and of other remote-delivery 
outlets such as websites, with the corresponding savings in costs associated with the need for less 
employees and branches. Another factor possibly contributing to the higher scale economies found 
in the more recent period was the increasing internationalization of banking activity brought about by 
technological progress, ﬁ  nancial innovation and increasing economic integration among EU mem-
bers. In fact, the expansion of the relevant market for banks’ activity beyond national borders brought 
about new growth opportunities while, to some extent, exposed them to increased competition from 
non-resident banks. Moreover, even the largest banks in the Portuguese ﬁ  nancial system are rela-
tively small when compared to their international counterparts.
3.4. Cost efﬁ  ciency
Table 6 presents the obtained estimates for the cost efﬁ  ciency of Portuguese banks between 1992 
and 2004. As indicated above, results are based on a speciﬁ  cation which does not include determi-
nants of inefﬁ  ciency. Further, η  – the parameter for the change in cost efﬁ  ciency through time – was 
not found to be statistically signiﬁ  cant, and so was constrained to zero. Hence, the distance at which 
Table 6
COST EFFICIENCY ESTIMATES
















Note: Total loans adjusted for securitization are used as weights in the 
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each bank stands from the cost frontier representing best practices does not seem to have changed 
during the period under scrutiny.13
The aggregate estimate for inefﬁ  ciency lies just below 91%, suggesting that Portuguese banks could 
theoretically have produced the same output while incurring only 91% of their actual costs. Some 
heterogeneity across banks was found, with estimated efﬁ  ciency scores ranging from a minimum of 
84% to a maximum of 99%.
3.5. Technological progress
The estimated cost function also includes a time trend as a translog term, which allows for the com-
putation of both Hicksian neutral and non neutral technological progress. Total cost reducing techno-
logical progress, i.e., shifts to the frontier brought about by the adoption of more efﬁ  cient production 





As shown in Table 7, technological progress was very low (and not statistically signiﬁ  cant) during the 
ﬁ  rst half of the 1990’s. More recently, as banks adjusted to the sector’s liberalization and the process 
of consolidation and ﬁ  nancial innovation progressed, technological progress has intensiﬁ  ed. These 
developments should be regarded in the context of global ﬁ  nancial integration, which catalysed the 
swift adoption of more efﬁ  cient technology. The estimate for technological progress found for 2004 
should be interpreted as indicating that, in this year, Portuguese banks operating according to the 
industry’s best practices could produce the same output as in the previous year incurring 3.2% lower 
total costs.
(13) The fact that the aggregate value of the cost efﬁ  ciency estimate shown in Table 6 is not constant, even though (as inferred from the lack of statistical 
signiﬁ  cance of η ) each bank’s efﬁ  ciency estimate is time invariant, is motivated by a composition effect. In fact, due to changes in banks’ market shares, 
the weights used in aggregation (the value of granted loans) are not constant and, due to mergers/acquisitions and to the emergence of new banks, 
estimation relies on an unbalanced panel of data.
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3.6. Total factor productivity growth
In this section the parameters of the estimated cost function are used to compute a measure of 
total factor productivity change () TFPC  which may be decomposed into the effect of cost efﬁ  ciency 
change  () EC , technological progress () TP  and returns to scale () RTS  (see Bauer (1990) for 
details):
TFPC EC TC RTS =++ (14)
or
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Where  r ε  is the elasticity of cost with respect to output r  and each term of the decomposition 
has an interesting interpretation. In fact, according to the expression above, total factor productivity 
change comprises catching-up to the cost frontier (cost efﬁ  ciency change), shifts in the frontier itself 
over time (technical progress) and shifts along the frontier (returns to scale component). The effect 
of returns to scale represents the pure impact on total costs stemming from changes in output after 
allowing for input requirements and it is positive if a bank with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale 
increases (decreases) its production.
It should be taken into account that Equation (15) is presented as proposed in Bauer (1990), with 
the necessary changes to account for the inclusion of equity in the estimated cost function. As such, 
the concept of economic scale economies (ESE) is used instead of the classical measure of scale 
economies presented in Equation (9).
The results for total factor productivity change in the Portuguese banking sector during the period 
under consideration are summarized in Table 8 and in Chart 5. The most striking result is that total 
factor productivity change has been mainly driven by technological progress, which became stronger 
throughout the sample period. Scale efﬁ  ciency change also made a positive contribution towards total 
factor productivity growth, especially during the more recent years, since output increased whereas 
increasing returns to scale were observed.15
Cost efﬁ  ciency remained virtually constant throughout the period. Combining the three effects one 
ﬁ  nds that the slow total factor productivity growth observed during the early 1990’s increased signiﬁ  -
cantly throughout the decade, reaching a value above 4% in 2004.
(15) This effect is particularly clear in 2000, when signiﬁ  cant mergers occurred.Part II  |  Articles
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper analyses the production technology of Portuguese banks during the 1992-2004 period 
through the estimation of a translog cost frontier. Banks are modelled as ﬁ  rms which produce loans 
and other earning assets, choosing the cost minimizing combination of labour, capital and interest 
bearing debt, subject to holding a given level of equity.
Several different speciﬁ  cations were tested for the distribution of estimated inefﬁ  ciency. Banks with 
higher credit risk and with more idle liquidity were found to be more cost inefﬁ  cient, possibly reﬂ  ect-
ing the fact that these variables are in a way proxies for manager quality/sophistication. On the other 
hand, relatively larger and more capitalised banks were found to be more cost efﬁ  cient, which could 
Table 8
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Year Scale Efﬁ  ciency 
Change
Technical Efﬁ  ciency 
Change
Technological Change Total Factor 
Productivity Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1993 0.39% 0.00% -0.05% 0.34%
1994 0.36% 0.00% 0.21% 0.57%
1995 0.28% 0.00% 0.50% 0.78%
1996 0.17% 0.00% 0.82% 0.99%
1997 0.28% 0.00% 1.12% 1.41%
1998 1.00% -0.01% 1.37% 2.37%
1999 0.73% 0.00% 1.60% 2.33%
2000 2.83% 0.00% 2.00% 4.83%
2001 1.33% 0.00% 2.38% 3.71%
2002 0.18% 0.00% 2.66% 2.83%
2003 0.44% 0.00% 2.91% 3.35%
2004 1.11% 0.00% 3.12% 4.23%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Total loans adjusted for securitization are used as weights in the computation of means. 
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indicate, respectively, that larger banks are able to attract more competent managers and that strong 
capitalisation is an effective way of reducing agency problems. The more detailed analysis whose 
results are brieﬂ  y summarised below was carried out based on the estimation results of a simpler 
model where no determinants of inefﬁ  ciency were included.
Portuguese banks’ marginal costs in the production of loans and other earning assets were found to 
follow to a large extent the decline in nominal interest rates observed throughout the period under 
consideration. Still, a signiﬁ  cant part of the decrease in total marginal costs is explained by a reduc-
tion in the real resource marginal cost. In 2004, the last year included in this exercise, the estimate for 
this measure amounted to 1.2% in the production of loans (the corresponding ﬁ  gure for other earning 
assets is 1.3%).
Banks’ capital structure was accounted for in the analysis by including equity as a ﬁ  xed input in the 
cost function. This procedure allowed for the computation of estimates for banks’ shadow cost of eq-
uity, which should be interpreted as a lower bound to banks’ true willingness to pay for equity capital. 
Hence, it is not surprising to ﬁ  nd that they are lower than levels compatible with usually accepted 
equity risk premia. Furthermore, the estimated shadow cost of equity follows quite closely the devel-
opments in market interest rates.
On average, Portuguese banks were found to operate with a cost inefﬁ  ciency level around 9%, indi-
cating that they could theoretically produce the same output incurring only 91% of their actual cost. 
The magnitude of cost reducing technological progress was found to increase through time, standing 
at 2.2% at the (weighted) sample mean and at 3.2% in 2004. Accounting for banks’ capital structure, 
signiﬁ  cant scale economies were found, especially in the more recent period. Further, the results 
point to the existence of economies of scope in the joint production of loans and other earning assets.
Against the background of the liberalization and privatization of the banking system and of increasing 
ﬁ  nancial innovation, the cost frontier representing best practices has shifted downwards over time. 
The distance between banks’ actual costs and the cost frontier, on the other hand, has not changed 
signiﬁ  cantly. Since banks with increasing returns to scale increased their production, there was a 
move along the cost function which also contributed to an increase in productivity.
Combining these results, estimates for total factor productivity change were computed, amounting 
to 2.8% each year on average, which results in a total productivity increase of 31.4% between 1992 
and 2004. The increase in productivity was more marked in the more recent period, recording a value 
of 4.2% in 2004.Part II  |  Articles
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